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Abstract: Terrorism with religious ideological background today is a serious global threat. The modern 
infrastructure and the communications of movement allowed terrorist organizations to be able to attack 
everywhere in the world. The issue that is a point of interest of this paper is the current situation of 
returning the foreign terrorist fighters to their home country or third countries and the security 
consequences that may arise if they are not treated properly. For a more detailed perception of this 
problem through the case analysis – an operative police action related to the foreign terrorist fighters, the 
functional aspects of the criminal prosecution bodies of the Republic of North Macedonia will be better 
perceived and studied. Also, a special emphasis will be placed on the strategy for the fight against violent 
extremism and the financing of terrorist fighters. 
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Along with the escalation of wars in the Near East, the emergence of foreign 
terrorist fighters became an important issue, which has led the countries around the 
world to face the problem when their citizens join these groups. The opposing of the 
emergence of „the foreign terrorist fighters‟ and the violent extremism became a top 
priority of the international community which has contributed to changes and 
amendments to the existing legislation to initially resolve the issue with foreign fighters. 
The Resolutions 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014) of the United Nations Security Council 
adopted according to Chapter VII from the UN Charter, concluded that the flow of 
foreign terrorist fighters was an “international threat to peace and security”.  As a result, 
the Resolutions oblige the countries to undertake wide measures to prevent and 
suppress this flow. Resolution 2396 of the UN Security Council (2017) calls for further 
actions in the areas of border security and the exchange of information, judicial 
measures, and co-operation, as well as strategies for prosecuting, rehabilitating, and 
reintegrating foreign terrorist fighters. 
The extremist groups and their networks promote violent extremism by different 
methods. Their continuous existence relies on recruiting others for their cause.  The 
violent extremist groups get new supporters and as a result of individual perception of 
injustice and need for a form of political activism. They join to meet their socio-cultural 
needs related to the identity issue. They are looking for an essence, which in a form of 
ideology is purposely produced by the extremist (terrorist) groups. Some individuals join 
for personal achievement and advancement, which leads to access to the organized 
criminal groups and improved incomes etc. (Talking Extremism 2012). The phenomenon 
of the foreign terrorist fighters is closely related to the increase in the execution of the 
acts by the terrorists operating alone or in small cells. They can be a significant threat 
when returning to their home countries, but also the threat comes from people who 
haven‟t provided resources for traveling and take part in the wars in the Near East or 
were prevented from traveling by the security services. The inability of travelling to Syria, 
Iraq, or other countries makes them frustrated and more vulnerable to attack in their 
home countries. The involvement of several foreign fighters in the terrorist attacks in 
Brussels, Paris, London, and Istanbul from 2015 to 2017 just confirmed the risk and the 
danger of the countries from these people.   
 
LEGAL PROVISIONS RELATED TO FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS 
 
In the Republic of North Macedonia, special attention is paid to terrorism and the 
fight against it. From 1996, under the Criminal Code, the criminal offense of terrorist 
endangerment of the constitutional order and security has been prescribed (Dimovski 
and Ilijevski 2011, 35). Furthermore, in 2004 another act was established - a terrorist 
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organization, and in 2008 two more acts - terrorism and financing of terrorism. Also, 
since 1996, the crime of „international terrorism‟ has been established. Specific to these 
crimes is that in the previous period their content was directed to several changes 
stating their essence and prescribing stricter sanctions, and in 2009 they became subject 
to prolonged confiscation (Krstevska 2017, 254). 
Because of the new forms of terrorist acts and the spreading of the phenomenon 
of radicalization and violent extremism in September 2014, the Macedonian Assembly 
adopted changes in the Criminal Code that sanction the recruitment, the training, the 
agitating, the logistics, the financing, and the participation of people in War conflicts 
outside the country and in foreign paramilitaries and terrorist organizations. The revised 
legislation introduced a new criminal act „Participating in foreign military, police, 
paramilitary or parapolice formations‟ to prosecute the Macedonian citizens who have in 
different ways participated in the paramilitary terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria. 
According to the amendments of the Law, participation, recruitment, training, agitation, 
logistics, and financing are criminal offenses for which minimum sentences of four or 
five years in prison are provided. The minimal prison sentence of five years is provided 
for the direct participants in the war conflicts, their instructors, the financiers, and the 
logisticians. One year less is the minimum sentence for people who recruit or encourage 
or call for participation through tests, speeches, and promotion on social networks. 
From the variety of criminal acts of the Criminal Code of the Republic of North 
Macedonia is recognized the effort of the Macedonian criminal legalization to proceed 
and implement all international efforts to combat terrorism at the national and 
international level. From a normative point of view, the framework of the number and 
type of criminal offenses is solid, but that is not a guarantee that in the application of 




 Radicalization is a dynamic process that is not a threat to society if it is not 
related to violence or other illegal acts. Radicalization can occur in many different 
circumstances in different ways and at different speeds. Every case of terrorist 
radicalization and recruitment for terrorism is a result of a unique intersection of the 
environment with the personal circumstances and the psychology of the people 
(Preventing Terrorism, OSCE 2014, 35). Radicalization is seen as a process when a person 
increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve certain political, ideological, or 
religious goals. The process of radicalization that results in violent extremism is 
characterized by (Action plan 2014): 
 Cognitive development towards a stable one-sided perception of the reality, 
where there is no space for alternative perspectives; 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 7, No. 1, 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                            
 30 
 Further development where the perception of the reality is experienced so 
acutely and seriously that violent action seems necessary and just. 
 
Having in mind the basic characteristics of terrorist recruitment and acting with 
all their complexities, certain terrorist activities would be possible only if their internal 
organization has a built-in policy of radicalization of membership and recruits. It stems 
from the use of political and cultural violence where such a strategy can only be fulfilled 
by a radicalized „fighter‟. The modern analysis of terrorism pays great attention to the 
phenomenon of radicalization which is closely related to the recruitment process (Fatic 
2014, 214). 
With the advancement of technology or the development of internet 
communication and propaganda techniques, the possibility for faster and simpler 
contact of extremists with the targeted population has increased and facilitated. In the 
past two decades, the Internet became a necessary tool in the extremists‟ strategy. In 
this regard, it can be mentioned that radicalization and recruitment are done through 
social networks and other internet applications (Balkan Jihadists 2016, 28). Cases of self-
radicalization through access and use of extremist internet channels are familiar as well 
as ones through the written literature. 
The internet propaganda of the extremists is also present in the Republic of 
North Macedonia where the Islamic radicals use the Internet to publish religious content 
and contacts with like-minded people from the country and abroad (KCSS 2018, 35). The 
radicalization and the setting of direct contact with the notorious terrorist organization 
ISIS through propaganda sites and social channels on the internet are outside of 
mosques or improvised religious objects. With the help of technology those who 
radicalize don‟t have to be physically present in the Republic of North Macedonia. In 
North Macedonia, due to the inconsistent application of the legal norms and 
sanctioning of electronic media, internet radicalization finds a suitable ground and is a 
dangerous tool for radicalization and recruitment of future terrorists. 
 
PROFILE OF A FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTER 
 
 The researches have shown that there is no single and unified profile of a foreign 
terrorist fighter or all the assumptions in the creation of a profile have proven wrong 
(Guidelines OSCE/ODIHR 2018, 14). Most of the studies on this topic analyze the 
motivation and the factors because of which the foreign fighters decide to go on the 
battlefields. Many foreign terrorist fighters suffer from antisocial psychological disorders 
manifested by low patience control, problems with stress and anger management, 
aggression, and violence in social relations. According to the Counterterrorism Strategy 
of the Republic of North Macedonia, the profiles built based on stereotypical 
assumptions based on religion, ethnicity, race, gender, socio-economic status, etc. are 
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not only discriminating but at the same time, they are inefficient, with a risk to 
encourage the spread of the violent extremism and terrorism. For these reasons, it is 
stated that the identification of terrorism with any nationality, religion, or ethnicity 
should be rejected. Even though there is no unique profile of a typical foreign terrorist 
fighter from the Western Balkans, the individuals who have left have general common 
characteristics like relations with the Diaspora in the EU (especially in Austria and 
Germany) and criminal past before their leaving. Other common characteristics of 
foreign terrorist fighters are the low educational level, unemployment, dysfunctional or 
broken families as well as mental problems. The Strategy emphasizes that the most 
probable rivers of the threat from the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, or 
factors that influence and „move forward‟ the terrorists are the economic; social and 
ideological factors (National Strategy 2018, 12-28). 
The main reasons for the departure of the people are the economic reasons, i.e. 
these families have had very modest financial incomes or have received social help, 
another reason is the low educational level, and an interesting point is that a motive for 
their indoctrination can be some tragic events in their personal life, personal crisis, etc.  
In the part of the factors (the pull factors) that pull them are empathy and the feeling of 
belonging to a certain group, i.e. they show solidarity with the people who are there and 
what is happening to them. It can be concluded that the foreign terrorist fighters, i.e. 
many of them, knowingly left the battlefields in Syria and Iraq, i.e. that solidarity is one 
of the main reasons why they left (NEXUS 2020, 8). 
If the basic features and characteristics of the convicts for participation in foreign 
army, police, and paramilitary or parapolice formations in the Republic of North 
Macedonia are analyzed, it can be concluded the diversity of their profiles (Analytica 
2018, 25). The fact that among the convicts there is a journalist, a doctor, a civil servant, 
a jeweler, a taxi driver, etc. some of them are young and some of them are older, it is 
wrong to make stereotypes about a certain category of people. 
 
FINANCING FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS 
 
An important stage in the planning and realization of the terrorist activities is the 
providing of financial resources for implementation and dissemination of their ideology, 
as well as for the maintenance of the terrorist organizations themselves. They strive to 
achieve maximum results through minimal spending of their resources. 
How terrorist organizations provide finances is dynamic and can change fast. At 
the moment it is assumed that the finances given to the foreign fighters for joining the 
terrorist organizations are insignificant, but they are still an important source of 
financing. The terrorist organizations are financing the trip, the daily living expenses, the 
training, and the equipment of the foreign terrorist fighters (Barrett 2017, 45).  
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Some of the foreign fighters raise money to travel to their mother country; others 
are helped by funds and donations from the Diaspora. Those who cover their costs for 
joining a terrorist organization by themselves get a refund at their final destination. 
Due to the actuality of the problem and the development of the phenomena of 
foreign terrorist fighters the countries are forced to consider the existing mechanisms 
for prevention of the financing of terrorism, as well as to introduce new specially 
designed mechanisms that will hinder and disrupt the financial support of the foreign 
fighters. The analysis of the bank accounts, the debts, and then transfers to foreign 
terrorist fighters is of great importance (RAN Manual 2017, 28). 
Some of the countries in the world in addition to criminalizing the financing of 
terrorism also introduce in their legislation the financing for the travel of foreign 
terrorist fighters for terrorism and the receipt of terrorist training.  In that direction, the 
rapid exchange of information between the countries and the use of the membership in 
the Egmont Group, the Interpol relations, the memoranda of cooperation, and the 
bilateral exchange of information are immeasurable. 
The Republic of North Macedonia in 2019 adopted the necessary bylaws of the 
Law on Restrictive Measures, including the Rulebook on the form and the content of 
records for implemented financial measures, including financial measures against 
terrorism and proliferation, Decision on establishing a coordinating body to monitor the 
implementation of the restrictive measures and the Rulebook on the form, content, and 
manner of keeping the list of certain persons to whom financial measures against 
terrorism and spreading (dissemination) of weapons for mass destruction and their 
financing have been introduced (FIU 2018). To effectively implement the National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism as well as the National Strategy for Combating Money 
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, the Financial Intelligence Unit in cooperation 
with the National Coordinator for Prevention of Violent Extremism and Counter-
Terrorism has prepared a handbook on the non-profit sector exposure of the terrorist 
financing. In 2019, the Financial Intelligence Unit received notifications of six suspicious 
transactions for financing terrorism and submitted them to the competent institutions 
for further processing (Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, 93). 
 
STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
 
 To better respond to the complexity of the fight against terrorism and extremism, 
the Macedonian authorities in 2017 established a National Committee for preventing 
violent extremism and fight against terrorism. This concept opens a new chapter in the 
fight against terrorism and violent extremism in the Republic of North Macedonia where 
the emphasis is placed on the need for greater coordination and involvement of all 
institutions in the system. This body has a goal to increase the efficiency and the 
coordination of the institutions and their activities in direction of more successful and 
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more efficient dealing and prevention from violent extremism and terrorism. As a result 
of this collaboration is planned better monitoring and evaluation of the activities 
envisaged in the National Action Plan in the area of prevention and dealing with violent 
extremism in the Republic of North Macedonia. 
  The strategies are focused on the measures for combating violent extremism and 
terrorism from an aspect of prevention, defense, protection of citizens and property, 
criminal prosecution, remediation of the consequences of a terrorist attack, 
coordination, and national and international cooperation. The commitment of the 
Republic of North Macedonia is reflected in the monitoring of the plans, concepts, and 
policies of the EU and NATO, as well as compliance with the resolutions and framework 
conventions on terrorism, the Council of Europe, as well as regional initiatives. 
The National Committee for Prevention of the Violent Extremism and the Fight 
against Terrorism, in co-operation with the OSCE, has recently organized a series of 
roundtables across the country to raise awareness of national counter-terrorism 
strategies and counter-violence extremism and affirmation of action plans. Also, in 
cooperation with international donors, the National Committee for the Prevention of 
Violent Extremism and the Fight against Terrorism has supported several projects aimed 
at recognizing the „early signs of radicalization and building community resistance to 
terrorist ideas‟ through training and engaging young people, parents, educators, and 
law enforcement officers. 
 
CASE ANALYSIS: ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIVE ACTION „CELL‟ 
 
 The operation „Cell‟1 is the first realized criminal-operational action of the 
Macedonian security organs for the crime of participation in a foreign army, police, 
paramilitary, and parapolice formations provided and punishable under Article 322-a of 
the Criminal Code of the Republic of North Macedonia. The action involved several 
dozen people, some of whom were found in the country, some were inaccessible to law 
enforcement agencies, and some, according to the information, were still active fighters 
in Syria and Iraq. Following the searches and the arrests, trials were conducted in which 
25 people were convicted. 
The first action „Cell‟ started on 06.08.2015 when after receiving orders from a 
judge in a preliminary procedure, a total of 28 searches were conducted, of which 21 
searches of homes and other premises in Skopje, 4 in Gostivar, and one each in Tetovo, 
Kumanovo, and Struga, with a total of 24 individuals and 4 facilities.  
                                                          
1
 Macedonian media that were reporting on the case and were accessed for data and information taking: 
www.mrt.com.mk, www.telma.com.mk, www.24.mk, www.tv21.tv, www.alsat-m.tv, www.a1on.mk, www.kanal5.com.mk, 
www.sitel.com.mk, www.alfa.mk, www.vecer.mk, www.denesen.mk, www.novamakedonija.com.mk, 
www.slobodnaevropa.mk, www.dw.com, www.mk.voanews.com, www.makfax.com.mk, www.plusinfo.mk, 
www.vesti.mk. 
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The four facilities included an internet cafe in Skopje, the ancillary facilities of the 
Tutunsuz Mosque, as well as the premises of two non-governmental organizations. 
During the operation, 9 people were secured, and another 27 who were covered by the 
investigation continued to be looked for. During the undertaken measures and activities 
about the conducted searches, with confirmation for confiscated items, were 
confiscated: 38 desktops, 18 laptops, 18 tablets, 119 mobile phones, 77 SIM cards, 65 
SIM card holders, 6 hard drives, 45 USB sticks, 35 memory cards, one pistol, tactical vest 
with waist and holster, cash (2,870 euros and 900 dollars), 3 travel documents, 114 CDs, 
Western Union Certificates, 2 boxers, 3 cameras, 3 cameras, MP3 player and two voice 
recorders. The confiscated items were handed over to the Department of Forensic 
Technical Investigations and Expertise for their further processing and expertise to find 
additional evidence related to the crime. 
The second police action „Cell 2‟ was conducted on 09.07.2016 as a continuation 
of the first action in which searches were conducted at 7 locations in Skopje and Tetovo 
and 5 desktops, 2 laptops, 19 mobile phones, 9 SIM cards were found. , SIM card holder, 
9 USB sticks, 50 CDs, memory cards, a protective mask, 3 travel documents, a T-shirt 
with the inscription in Arabic „Islamic State is eternal‟. Four people from Tetovo were 
caught. Three suspects were not available at that time, for two persons from Skopje and 
Kumanovo there was operational information that they were in Syria at that time, and 
the third person from the village of Arachinovo according to the operational information 
was in Skopje. 
The police operation „Cell 3‟ was conducted on 12.08.2016 in cooperation with 
the security services of the Republic of Turkey, where five Macedonian citizens were 
detained in the Turkish settlement of Aksaray on suspicion of being members of the 
Islamic State, i.e. they intended to join them. Namely, according to the information, the 
persons were previously radicalized, encouraged, and organized by Macedonian 
citizens-jihadists who stayed in Syria for a long time. The suspects left the Republic of 
North Macedonia and went to Turkey with the sole ultimate goal of joining the 
paramilitary mujahedeen units in Syria. Shortly afterward, they were extradited to our 
country, and criminal charges were filed against them. 
In August 2018, seven more Macedonian citizens were arrested, for whom an 
international arrest warrant has already been issued for participation in foreign armies, 
but also after previously filed criminal charges within the police actions „Cell 1‟ and „Cell 
2‟ from 2016. 
The „Cell‟ operation is another indicator that the institutions of the Republic of 
North Macedonia have the capacity and the credibility to deal with the current security 
challenges and are a serious partner in the Global Coalition to Combat Terrorism. The 
result of these police actions was obvious in the direction of a drastic decrease in the 
number of Macedonian citizens who joined ISIS or other formations in Syria and Iraq.  
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However, this does not mean that extremist ideas, the process of radicalization, 
and the threat of committing terrorist acts have disappeared from the Republic of North 
Macedonia. This is confirmed by the two police actions in 2020 in which a terrorist 
group in the Republic of North Macedonia composed of foreign fighters was 
suppressed. 
The first action was realized on 01.09.2020 when the Sector for Fight against 
Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Radicalism at the Ministry of Interior filed criminal 
charges against 3 people from Kumanovo. Searches were conducted at four locations in 
Skopje and Kumanovo and there were found 5 automatic rifles, a machine gun, 18 
frames for an automatic rifle with 30 bullets, a frame with 15 bullets, 3 wooden butts, a 
wooden butt with a firing mechanism, 3 grenade launchers were found. RD 40mm, 5 
grenade launchers for hand grenade launcher with fuses, 2 camouflage caps, 2 black 
and gray undercoats, 2 pairs of camouflage gloves, 2 tactical vests, 4 tactical vests in 
camouflage color, flag with written Arabic letters (ISIS), scarf with written Arabic letters. 
The second action was carried out on 27.12.2020 in which 8 people from Skopje 
and Kumanovo were detained. 8 locations were searched where military equipment and 
weapons were found. The terrorists communicated with each other on the Internet 
application „Watts Up‟ where they have agreed on how to transport the weapons and 
also agreed on how to make suicide belts. The Ministry of Interior informed that the 
terrorist cell planned a series of attacks on public buildings, liquidations, but also suicide 




 Violent extremism and terrorism as a global phenomenon still is a big threat to 
society, and the process of radicalization in different social settings is a reality that will 
continue to be a factor for new terrorist attacks. 
 Even though, all countries have adopted and are conducting the measures for 
punishing the foreign fighters they are still aware that the repression and the 
punishment are not always equated with awareness and repentance. Such measures 
may have an opposite effect and do further radicalization and realization of the 
terrorists‟ goals. The repressive approach ignores the issue of reintegration of the 
person into society. Closing or monitoring the movement of the foreign terrorist fighters 
is not enough to address the roots of this problem and therefore such measures may 
yield short-term results. For a long time, the countries of Europe should focus on 
accelerated development to create effective strategies to reduce the number of recruits 
- jihadists and in general the ideas of violent extremism and terrorism. By fundamentally 
understanding the motive for joining terrorist organizations and radicalization in general 
as a process, and most importantly the circumstances and conditions that enable it, 
countermeasures against violent extremist ideology are more likely to be used. 
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According to the National Strategies for Prevention of Violent Extremism and 
Counter-Terrorism, the Republic of North Macedonia implements programs for de-
radicalization of the foreign terrorist fighters in prisons, undertakes activities to increase 
the awareness of the risk and threats of terrorism, and strengthens the mechanisms for 
prevention of radicalization at the local level. To this end, the whole society must be 
involved in increasing the awareness of radicalization in the community and in building 
internal capacities to oppose it. 
Here are some recommendations: 
 developing a specific policy for foreign terrorist fighters in the overall framework 
for the fight against terrorism; 
 designing an instrument for assessing the risk of repatriated foreign terrorist 
fighters and supporting research in this area; 
 providing appropriate medical assistance to the traumatized returnee foreign 
terrorist fighters; 
 increased attention to returnee children from conflict regions; and 
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